An anonymous delegation system enables individuals to retrieve rights and to delegate different subparts of these rights to different entities. The delegation procedure is anonymous, such that no collusion of entities can track an individual's delegation behavior. On the other hand, it is ensured that a user cannot abuse her delegation capabilities.
Introduction
The concept of authentication and authorization has long been studied in computer science. Intuitively, all proposed solutions follow the same procedure: the user first retrieves her access rights from a trusted authority and afterwards shows it to a service provider. For security reasons, the retrieval protocol will typically be performed in an identified or pseudonymous manner. The showing protocol, on the other hand, may be performed in an anonymous but controlled fashion: users are anonymous but can still be held accountable for their actions [3, 5] .
In many applications, the owner of a right may need to delegate part of her right to a different entity. Consider, for example, a doctor having access to a medical database. When she is absent from the hospital, she may grant one of her assistants the access to some specific files in the database. She will prefer this delegation procedure to be anonymous, such that no central authority can monitor her delegation behavior. On the other hand, measures must be taken to control her delegation capabilities. This paper introduces a general delegation model and presents three implementations. Our implementations are based on credential systems and provide both anonymity for the individual and security for the organizations. The implementations are compared based on their functionality, privacy and security characteristics. Additionally, some guidelines are given for choosing a particular implementation based on the application's requirements.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a formal model of the delegation system. Section 3 then describes the basic building blocks used in our implementations: commitment schemes, credential systems and verifiable encryptions. Our credential-based implementations are presented and evaluated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides a comparison of the implementations and gives some general guidelines.
Delegation model
We first present a general model for the anonymous delegation of rights. Section 2.1 gives a global overview of the system's entities and protocols. Section 2.2 then states some assumptions on the behavior of these entities and section 2.3 describes a general set of requirements on the system's behavior. entire right. As an example, consider a right granting full database access to U. When showing this right to V, U may decide to only reveal her access rights for a particular subpart of the database.
Finally, a right can be revoked by means of the RevokeRight protocol. The input to this protocol is a revocation tag revTag. This tag can be found as a unique subpart of the IssueTrans transcript.
Assumptions
We employ the following assumptions concerning the entities in the system.
• System registrar and organizations can be trusted to perform their tasks correctly, i.e. they follow the protocols. This is a reasonable assumption and can, for example, be enforced by collecting secure logs of the parties' activities.
• All entities in the system (i.e. users, organizations and system registrar) can freely exchange their information. In particular, users may provide information about the rights they have received. Note, however, that entities will not give away any information of which the secrecy is important to themselves. Examples of such information are secret keys, credit card numbers and revocation or tracking information of sub-rights issued by themselves.
Requirements
The system's requirements are divided into functionality, anonymity, security and performance requirements. Apart from the security requirements, all requirements are optional.
Functionality requirements.
F1. Ad-hoc delegation. Ad-hoc delegation gives a delegator the power to decide on the spot which rights to pass on to which entities. Although not mandatory, ad-hoc delegation greatly improves the flexibility of delegation.
F2. Expressiveness of constraints. The creator of a right may enforce some constraints on this right. We distinguish between constraints on usage and constraints on delegation.
(a) Constraints on usage. These constraints can be applied to any right and limit the general usability of this right. Examples of such constraints include the specification of validity periods or a limit on the number of show-protocols for the right.
(b) Constraints on delegation. These constraints can be applied to any right and limit the usability of the right for issuing corresponding sub-rights. The following constraints may be set:
i. A limit on the number of sub-rights that can be issued based on a right. ii. A limit on the depth of a right's delegation tree. As an example, this limit is set to one in situations where a doctor may issue sub-rights to her assistants, but where her assistants are not allowed to issue sub-rights of themselves. iii. Constraints on the types of sub-rights that can be issued. The constraints on a subright must naturally be more strict or at least as strict as the constraints on its main-right. In particular, the sub-right's right specifications, number of usages and validity period must be less than or equal to what is specified for the corresponding main-right. In addition, the sub-right's delegation tree depth and number of subrights must be strictly less than what is specified for the main-right. Next to these traditional constraints, additional constraints may be set by the issuer of the main-right. For example, a main-right allowing full access to a database, may only be allowed to issue sub-rights for accessing a very limited subpart of this database. iv. Constraints on the choice of sub-right owners. Many applications require constraints on the characteristics of potential sub-right owners. A main-right enabling doctor's access to a medical database, for example, may only be used to issue sub-rights to the assistants of this particular doctor.
Anonymity requirements.
A1. Privacy preserving show protocol. The ShowRight protocol should not reveal more information than what is absolutely necessary to gain access to V 's services. In particular, the following requirements should be satisfied:
(a) Anonymity. Service access is anonymous.
(b) Unlinkability. Different service accesses based on the same right cannot be linked to each other.
(c) Right indistinguishability. The access protocol does not reveal any information on how the right was obtained: i.e. whether it was obtained through an IssueRight protocol or through a DelegateRight protocol.
A2. Sub-right unlinkability. Different sub-rights deduced from the same main-right must not be linkable to each other, even when all parties in the system (except for the main-right owner) share their information. This ensures that a user's delegation behavior cannot be tracked by the other entities.
A3. Monitoring of rights. In some applications, the issuer of a right wants to monitor the usage of this right. She then receives additional information about when a right has been shown and to which verifier. Monitoring should only be allowed for the rightful issuer and may not reveal any additional information on the identity of the right's owner. Whenever a monitorable right has issued sub-rights, these sub-rights must also be monitorable by the issuer of the original right. We distinguish between immediate monitoring (i.e. the right can be monitored right from the start) and delayed monitoring (i.e. monitoring is delayed until after the occurrence of a predefined event). Note that the presence of delayed monitoring implicitly implies the possibility for immediate monitoring. This is achieved by setting the predefined event to "null".
Security requirements. The following security requirements are mandatory. If one of them is missing, the entire system is insecure.
S1
. Unforgeability. This requirement states the inability of users to successfully show a right which was not obtained by means of an IssueRight or of a DelegateRight protocol.
S2. Correct sub-rights. Users should not be able to successfully show a sub-right of which the encoded rights are less strict than what is specified in its main-right.
S3. Non-transferability. Unless explicitly specified otherwise, the legitimate owner of a right must not be able to pass on her "actual" right to other users. Here, the "actual" right refers to the digital tokens constituting the right. Hence, the situation of passing on a right by issuing a sub-right identical to the original right is, if allowed by the right, still possible.
S4. Consistency of rights. Unless explicitly specified otherwise, rights must be bound to their owner. In particular, it may not be possible for users to pool their rights in order to gain an asset (e.g. the access to a service or a new right), which each of them separately could not have obtained by correctly executing the protocols.
S5. Correct revocation. Rights must be revocable and the revocation of a right must include the revocation of all the rights in its delegation tree. In addition, users should be prohibited to request the revocation of rights they did not issue themselves.
S6. Conditional deanonymization. In case of abuse of a right, appropriate measures should be taken. We distinguish two types of actions.
(a) conditional retrieval of the owner's identity.
(b) conditional retrieval of the right's issue transcript, enabling the right's revocation.
Performance requirements. The adopted protocols must be efficient, such that practical implementations are possible. Furthermore, additional entities for the delegation should be prohibited as much as possible. Indeed, an ideal DelegateRight protocol is a protocol between a main-right owner and a sub-right owner only. Whenever an additional entity is needed, this entity must be available constantly. This implies a loss in efficiency, and hence this scenario should be avoided as much as possible.
Protocols in our base system
Our constructions are based on commitments, credential systems and verifiable encryptions. We briefly introduce these concepts and their primitives. All communication between entities must be performed over anonymous communication channels.
Commitments. A commitment [13, 10] can be seen as the digital analogue of a "non-transparent sealed envelope" [12] . It enables a committer to hide a set of attributes (non-transparency property), while at the same time preventing her from changing these values after commitment (sealed property). The primitive
enables an entity E to create a commitment Comm to a set of attributes. Additionally, she retrieves a secret key OpenInfo containing, among others, the attributes encoded into Comm. This key can be used to prove properties concerning the attributes.
The public input to this protocol is both a commitment Comm and a boolean predicate P concerning Comm's attributes. If E 2 accepts, she is convinced that E 1 knows the OpenInfo belonging to Comm, and that Comm's attributes satisfy predicate P . She does not find out any other information about Comm and its attributes. The CommProps protocol is an interactive protocol. Nevertheless, we adopt the one-headed arrow E 1 → E 2 in our notation. This is to avoid any ambiguity that may result from our traditional (double-headed) arrow notation. Intuitively, the one-headed arrow makes clear that it is E 1 who proves commitment properties to E 2 , and not the other way around.
Credentials. A credential system [3, 5] allows for anonymous yet accountable transactions between users and organizations. In the remainder, we employ the system proposed by Camenisch et al. [5, 2, 9] . The system's CredGet and CredShow protocols are interactive protocols. Again, we adopt one-headed arrows to avoid any confusion in their interpretation.
A credential Cred is retrieved from I by means of the CredGet protocol.
Cred contains a set of attributes and a set of show-limits (sl 1 , . . . , sl n ) corresponding to different show-modes. Additionally, it contains a secret key for showing it to a verifier. Each attribute is constructed as a separate function G(.) of public values and attributes encoded into previously shown credentials or commitments. As an example, attr 1 may be constructed as attr 1 := Cred x .a 1 + 5, where Cred x .a 1 refers to attribute a 1 of a previously shown credential Cred x . I cannot find out any information concerning the credential's final attributes, apart from the fact that they are constructed correctly based on G(.).
A show-limit sl i ∈ N ∪ { * } (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) denotes the maximal number of times that a credential can be shown in show-mode i. Here, notation " * " denotes a show-limit which is set to infinity. Whenever a limit sl i is exceeded, this is detected and appropriate actions are taken. In the remainder, we make abstraction of the available techniques [7] for including these show-limits. Instead, we assume that a credential can only be shown k i times in show-mode i, and that showing it a (k i + 1)-th time will simply not succeed.
During the CredShow protocol, U shows her credential Cred to V.
As a result, U looses t i ≥ 0 show-instances for each show-mode i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). Note that t i may also be zero, which can be seen as a temporal suspension of the credential's limited-show property. Additionally, U reveals a boolean predicate P concerning public values, attributes occurring in Cred and attributes occurring in previously shown credentials or commitments. For example, P may be the predicate (attr 1 > C x .a 1 ∧ attr 1 < C x .a 2 ), where C x .a 1 and C x .a 2 refer to attributes a 1 and a 2 encoded into a previously shown commitment C x . V cannot learn any new information from the execution of the protocol, apart from the fact that U has a valid credential which is issued by I and of which the attributes satisfy P .
Different show-protocols of the same credential cannot be linked to each other, nor can they be linked to their issue protocol.
An eavesdropper listening in on the execution of either a CredGet or a CredShow protocol, cannot find out any other information than what can be deduced by the organization involved in the protocol. Hence, as long as the interaction is performed over an anonymous communication channel and as long as no confidential information is communicated between the parties, no confidentiality protection is needed on the communication lines.
Using the CredSign protocol, a credential can be used to sign a message msg.
The properties of this protocol are exactly the same as for the CredShow protocol, except for the additional fact that a message msg is now signed using the credential. For a convenient representation, we assume that a signature Sig also contains the signed data msg.
Verifiable encryptions. Verifiable encryptions [1, 6, 8] have all the characteristics of regular encryptions. Additionally, they enable their creator U to demonstrate properties of the encrypted plaintext. As an example, U can prove to E that the encrypted plaintext is encoded as an attribute in a credential or commitment. This will be denoted as a predicate c = VE(x), which can be included in the CommProps or CredShow primitives. Here, c refers to the ciphertext and x refers to the credential's (or commitment's) attribute x. Note that c is created using a public key pk of which the corresponding secret key sk may not be known by E. For ease of representation we omit the specifications of pk and its owner. We merely assume its owner to be an entity T which can be contacted when decryption is needed. Additionally, T is trusted not to perform any unwanted decryptions.
The use of credentials, commitments and verifiable encryptions offers numerous advantages in the construction of privacy-sensitive applications. Credentials are unforgeable (S1) and allow for service accesses which are anonymous (A1a) and unlinkable (A1b). By combining them with commitments and verifiable encryptions, additional properties such as non-transferability (S3), consistency of credentials (S4), conditional deanonymization (S6) and revocation (S5) can easily be added. We now give a hint on how these extensions can be achieved [3, 5] .
1. Non-transferability can be achieved by including a personal secret s u as an attribute into the credential. This may, for example, be a credit card number or the key to a bank account. Its value is unknown to I and is never explicitly shown to V. As the transfer of a right implies the transfer of this secret, users will not be inclined to give away their rights.
2. Consistency of rights is obtained by encoding a unique identifier into all credentials belonging to the same user. When multiple rights are shown to V, U additionally demonstrates that their encoded identifiers are the same. Note that this identifier is not known to I and that it is never shown to V. Personal secret s u can be used for this purpose.
3. Revocation can be achieved by encoding a unique issuer-defined revocation tag e into the credential. The right is then revoked by adding e to a public blacklist BL. Whenever U shows her credential to a verifier, she additionally proves that her revocation attribute is not included in BL.
4. Conditional deanonymization requires two additional attributes encoded into the right. The first attribute id is unknown to I and uniquely identifies the right's owner. The second attribute e is defined by I and uniquely specifies the right's issue protocol (this might, for example, be the right's revocation tag). Whenever the right is shown to a verifier, U provides V with verifiable encryptions VE(id) or VE(e). Upon fulfillment of the deanonymization condition, these value will be decrypted. Decryption of VE(id) enables a link with the right's owner, while VE(e)'s decryption enables the retrieval of the right's issue transcript.
Credential-based implementations
We now present our credential-based techniques for implementing the general delegation model of Section 2. 
Transferable credentials
This first technique employs transferable credentials and pseudonyms to construct rights that can be further delegated. Section 4.1.1 gives a global overview of the system and its primitives. The system itself is described in Section 4.1.2 and evaluated in Section 4.1.3.
Setting
Each user in the system has a non-sharable external user secret s u (for example, a credit card number or a secret signing key). We assume the value of this secret not to be in the control of the user. Instead, the value is chosen randomly by a trusted authority or by trusted hardware. Based on s u , U can create pseudonyms P u having some very useful properties. In particular, P u unconditionally hides its underlying value s u . Next to this, only the legitimate creator of P u can prove to be the owner of the pseudonym. A main-right is now represented as a transferable credential (i.e. a credential which does not explicitly encode s u ) containing a number of pseudonyms. Each pseudonym belongs to a particular entity and is associated with a specific sub-right. The right is delegated by passing on the credential. The resulting sub-right cannot be further delegated, but can be shown to a verifier by showing the credential and by additionally proving ownership of a pseudonym encoded into the credential. We now describe the cryptographic constructs to achieve this system. User secret s u is a random number in Z * n with n an RSA modulus. For example, s u may be chosen randomly by a trusted authority and may be used as a pre-image for the user's credit card number. Furthermore, two functions f and nym are defined as follows.
Value v is a prime number such that gcd(v, φ(n)) = 1. This value should be chosen very carefully to enable efficient zero-knowledge proofs of the relation y = f (x) for values y and x encoded into a commitment or credential. Bresson and Stern [4] provide a proof technique requiring a complexity of O(log 2 (v)). As such, the popular value v = 2 16 + 1 may be used as an exponent.
Note that f is a one-way function. Function nym can be used to compute pseudonyms P u = nym(s u , r), where r is a random value in Z * n . User U can easily prove to be the owner of the pseudonym, by proving knowledge of values s u and r, such that s u is the user's non-transferable user secret and P u = nym(s u , r). The following properties can be shown to hold. Proposition 1. P u unconditionally hides s u Proof. For every value s u ∈ Z * n , a unique value r = (P u /s u ) 1/v mod n can be computed such that P u = s u .r v mod n. As a consequence, P u reveals nothing about its underlying value s u . Proposition 2. Under the RSA assumption for a public RSA key (n, v), the following actions cannot be achieved.
1. Given a tuple (P, s u ) ∈ Z * n × Z * n , find a value r such that P = nym(s u , r).
2. Given a tuple (s u , s u ) ∈ Z * n × Z * n , find values r and s such that nym(s u , r) = nym(s u , s).
We only give a brief sketch of the proofs for both statements. 1. Let A be an adversary who receives as input a tuple (s u , P ) ∈ Z * n × Z * n and who subsequently outputs with non-negligible probability a value r such that P = s u r v mod n. We now sketch how an adversary B can use A to break the RSA assumption. In a first step, B retrieves as input a random value e ∈ Z * n . She picks s u ∈ R Z * n , computes P = e.s u mod n and feeds (s u , P ) as input to A. When receiving an answer r from A, B checks whether P = s u r v mod n. If so, she outputs r. As r v ≡ P/s u ≡ e mod n, B has now broken the RSA assumption.
2. Let A be an adversary who receives as input a tuple (s u , s u ) ∈ Z * n ×Z * n and who subsequently outputs with non-negligible probability a tuple (r, s) such that nym(s u , r) = nym(s u , s). We now sketch an algorithm B that can be used to break the RSA assumption. B receives as input a random value e ∈ Z * n . She chooses s u ∈ R Z * n , computes s u = s u /e mod n and feeds tuple (s u , s u ) as input to A. After a while, she receives tuple (r, s) from A. She checks whether nym(s u , r) = nym(s u , s). If so, she outputs x = s/r. As x v ≡ (s/r) v ≡ s u /s u = e mod n, B has broken our RSA assumption.
This concludes our sketch of the proof.
Note that the properties of Proposition 2 can be seen as a special type of one-wayness and collision-resistance, which are achieved when the first argument s u of function nym is a random predefined value. Corollary 1. Only the legitimate creator U of a pseudonym P u can find values s u and r such that P u = nym(s u , r) and such that s u is U's non-transferable usersecret.
The delegation system
The system is depicted in Figure 1 . Table 2 gives an overview of the communication channels used during the protocol. As to protect the anonymity of users, most communication is performed over anonymous communication channels. Authentication, integrity and confidentiality can be realized by running TLS/SSL over anonymous communication channels. We now give a brief overview of the protocols. 
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• IssueRight.
De:
request revocation of the right with revocation tag revTag -RM RM : if (revTag == e) then add e to BL right if (revTag == (P de , h)) then add (P de , h) to BL sub Registration. A user entering the system must be in possession of an external credential Cred ext , containing as its attribute a non-transferable and randomly chosen user secret s u . U shows Cred ext to RG and optionally identifies herself. If this is successful, she receives a new credential Cred u containing her user secret s u . In the remainder, we will refer to this credential as Cred do , Cred de or Cred u , depending on the owner's role as respectively a delegator, a delegate or a user.
IssueRight. For ease of representation, we describe the issuing protocol for rights encoding only one potential delegate and limited to issuing sub-rights identical to the original right. Generalizations towards multiple delegates and sub-right types can straightforwardly be achieved by adding additional attributes.
The protocol consists of two phases, which can be separated in time. During the first phase, De sends Do her pseudonym P de . She additionally proves that it is correctly formed as P de = nym(s de , r de ), where s de is De's user secret and r de is a random value. Depending on the situation, Do may know De's identity or both parties may be anonymous with respect to each other. Furthermore, as to hide P de from possible eavesdroppers, the communication channel [DoDe1] is confidentiality-protected.
During the second phase, Do contacts I to retrieve the actual right. This right is represented as an unlimited-show credential containing three attributes; the delegator's pseudonym P do , a revocation tag revTag chosen by the issuer and a list delegates of potential delegates. Each potential delegate is represented as a tuple (P de , h) with P de a pseudonym for De and h = f (t de ) for t de = t do ·t i mod n. Value h will be used both for revocation purposes and for delegation purposes. Its value is chosen jointly by Do and by I and has some interesting properties:
• Do cannot manipulate h's value. As will become clear later, this prevents users for requesting illegal revocations.
• Only Do knows pre-image t de = f −1 (h). This ensures that only Do can issue a sub-right to De.
Note that the communication channel [DoI] between Do and I does not need to be confidentiality protected. In particular, value t de cannot be deduced from listening in on the communication. Also, even though an eavesdropper may obtain the right's revocation tag e, she could also obtain this information directly from issuer I based on our assumption that all entities in the system may freely exchange their information (Section 2.2).
DelegateRight. Delegation of a right is very cheap. It is achieved by sending Cred right and t de = t i · t do mod n to De. As both values are confidential information, the communication is performed over a confidentiality-protected communication channel. The retrieved sub-right can not be further delegated and can be used multiple times by De in interactions with V.
ShowRight. U first constructs a commitment C show . This commitment contains her pseudonym P, value r used during the creation of P, and a value t which is set to f −1 (h) if the user is a delegate. She then shows both Cred u and Cred right to V, and additionally proves the following properties.
1. C show 's attribute P is correctly formed based on her user secret and random value r.
2. Right Cred right is not revoked.
3. Pseudonym P equals either the pseudonym P do of the Cred right 's original owner (i.e. Do), or it can be used with value t to construct a tuple (P, f (t)) representing a sub-right which has not been revoked.
Note that only a legitimate owner of an unrevoked right can successfully prove these statements.
RevokeRight. A main-right is revoked by adding its revocation tag e to blacklist BL right . A sub-right is revoked by adding its identifying tuple (P de , h) to blacklist BL sub . Before performing a revocation, RM receives a revocation request from an entity E in the system. Requests from identified entities such as issuers or verifiers generally pose no problem, as they can easily be held accountable for their actions. Care must be taken, however, when requests are made by unidentified entities. In general, these requests will only be granted if the requester can prove to be the owner of a main-right containing the tuple (P, h) requested for revocation. This proof protocol is given in Figure 2 . An important condition for this technique to work, is that h's value cannot be manipulated by Do during the IssueRight protocol. If h could be manipulated by Do, a malicious user could successfully invoke the revocation of a tuple (P, h). First, she performs an IssueRight protocol for a credential Cred right of which the delegate attribute is set to {(P, h)}. Afterwards, she requests the revocation of (P, h) by performing the protocol of Figure 2. 
Evaluation
The system presented above is limited to rights issued by I and to direct sub-rights thereof. Hence, the depth of a right's delegation tree is at most 1. In this evaluation, we will refer to a right issued by I as a main-right, and to all other rights in its delegation tree as its sub-rights.
Functionality requirements.
F1. True ad-hoc delegation is not possible. During the IssueRight protocol, Do specifies a list of potential delegates. Users not specified in this list will never be able to retrieve a valid corresponding sub-right. Users specified in the list may or may not retrieve a corresponding sub-right. This depends on the choice of the main-right owner.
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Figure 2: Revocation request for anonymous users
F2. Constraints on usage of a right (F2(a)) can easily be added by including additional attributes in Cred right . Such an attribute may then specify, either for the main-right or for one of its potential sub-rights, validity periods and restrictions on the usage of the right. Note that for a sub-right, these constraints must already be known when the main-right is issued. Moreover, because of the inability of a main-right owner to control the number of usages of a sub-right, it is not possible to constraint the number of usages of a right.
Constraints on delegation (F2(b)) can also be achieved. Multiple potential delegates retrieving multiple subright-types can be encoded by including this information as additional attributes in the credential. Furthermore, I has a great degree of control on both the maximal number of sub-rights that can be issued and the type of these sub-rights. She can also enforce constraints on the choice of delegates. Therefore, she encodes the required characteristics for these delegates into the main-right. When a corresponding sub-right is then shown to a verifier, the delegate must additionally prove possession of these requirements (e.g. by means of additional credentials). Finally, note that the system is limited to rights issued by I and to their direct sub-rights. Hence, the depth of a right's delegation tree (which is 1 for a right issued by I and 0 for a sub-right) is automatically set and must not explicitly be encoded.
A1. Thanks to the use of anonymous credentials, service accesses are anonymous and unlinkable. Next to this, right indistinguishability is achieved by making use of "OR" connectives when proving properties of credential Cred right .
A2. Sub-right unlinkability is not achieved. Multiple sub-rights resulting from the same right are all represented by the same credential Cred right and can hence easily be linked. They can also be linked towards their main-right's IssueRight protocol, due to the presence of revocation tag e. Remark however, that this linking can only occur when a delegate reveals (possibly secret) attribute information encoded into her credential Cred right . In particular, Do's delegation behavior with respect to "non-colluding" users cannot be discovered.
Note that credential Cred right can be freely distributed among the entities in the system. Hence, any of these entities can see the rights encoded into this credential, as well as the pseudonyms of both delegator and potential delegates. It is not possible to link any of these pseudonyms to real identities, however, unless these pseudonymous users come forward themselves.
A3. Delayed monitoring of rights can be achieved using the verifiable pseudorandom function proposed by Dodis and Yampolskiy [11] . This function has a form F (w, x) = g 1/(w+x+1) , for secret key w and input x, both elements of Z q , and for a generator g of a group G q of prime order q in which the decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion problem is hard. Given public output y the relation y = F (w, x) for a commitment's or credential's attributes w and x can easily be proven in zero knowledge. Delayed monitoring of main-rights (and hence also of its corresponding sub-rights) is then achieved as follows.
• Adaptations to the IssueRight protocol -Before the IssueRight protocol, Do constructs a pseudonym P do = nym(s do , r do ) that will be encoded in the final right. She sends this value to De and proves, using the CredShow protocol for Cred do , that this value is constructed correctly. -During the first phase of the IssueRight protocol, De chooses a random value v and includes it as an additional attribute into C de . She also computes y = f (v) and V v = VE(v) and transforms the original CredShow protocol for Cred de into the following CredSign protocol:
). Signature Sig de is then sent to Do. -During phase two of the IssueRight protocol, Do picks a random value w and encodes it as an additional attribute into C do . She computes z = f (w) and V w = VE(w), and sends Sig de , z and V w to I. By means of the CredShow protocol for Cred do , Do then proves to be the owner of pseudonym P do in signature Sig de . She also proves her knowledge of value w underlying the construction of z and V w . This is done by means of the CommProps primitive for C de . -Finally, Do receives a credential Cred right containing an additional attribute z := z and a delegates attribute containing a tuple of the form (P de , h, y).
• Adaptations to the ShowRight protocol.
-During the ShowRight protocol for a main-right, Do computes d = F (w, i) for i ∈ D with D a predefined domain. Note that each value i should be used at most once. Do then sends d to V and proves that it is constructed correctly based on the value f −1 (Cred right .z). If the ShowRight protocol is successful, V publishes d. -During the ShowRight protocol for a sub-right the same steps are executed, this time using values v instead of w and Cred right .delegates.y instead of Cred right .z. -Note that right indistinguishability can still be maintained by using appropriate OR-connectives.
• Upon fulfillment of the tracking condition, I requests the decryptions w of V w and v of V v and then computes all values F (w, i), F (v, i) for i ∈ D. She can now link all actions performed by the right or by any of its sub-rights. Note that in order to prevent unauthorized tracking by malicious entities, I must authenticate before retrieving the decryptions.
Delayed monitoring of only sub-rights can be achieved by performing some minor adjustments on the protocol as described above.
• During the IssueRight protocol, all actions concerning w, z and V w are skipped.
• The ShowRight protocol of a main-right is the same as in Figure 1 . Note again that right indistinguishability can be maintained by the adoption of OR-connectives.
• Only the rightful owner of the main-right can successfully request the decryption of an encryption V v included into Sig de . For this, she proves to be the owner of the signed pseudonym P do which is also included in Sig de .
Immediate monitoring can readily be applied from delayed monitoring by setting the tracking condition to always.
Security requirements.
S1
. Unforgeability of main-rights is guaranteed by the unforgeability of digital credentials. Subrights cannot be forged due to the unforgeability of credentials, Corollary 1 and the onewayness of f .
S2. Sub-rights are correct. All constraints on a sub-right are explicitly encoded into credential Cred right . As this credential is shown as part of each ShowRight protocol, it is impossible for users to successfully show an incorrectly constructed sub-right.
S3/4. Non-transferability and consistency of rights is achieved using similar ideas as described in Section 3. A slight difference with this solution is that here, the non-transferable user secret s u is not explicitly encoded into the right. Instead it is used as a basis for constructing the encoded pseudonyms.
S5. All rights are revocable and the revocation of a main-right implies the revocation of all the sub-rights in its revocation tree. In addition, users cannot request the revocation of rights which are not issued or owned by themselves.
S6. Conditional deanonymization can easily be added using similar techniques as described in Section 3. During the show protocol, the user provides V with a verifiable encryption of her identity or of her right's revocation tag. Note that the former can be achieved by encoding U 's identity into credential Cred u .
Performance requirements. The issuing of sub-rights is very cheap and does not require the help of any additional entity. The complexity of the system itself, however, rises with every additional delegate. Indeed, as Cred right contains a dataset for each delegate, its structure becomes larger if more delegates are encoded. Furthermore, Do must perform phase one of the IssueRight protocol for each of the delegates. We note that the ShowRight protocol can be optimized if rights indistinguishability is not required. The proven statement is then split up into different statements for main-rights and sub-rights. The resulting protocols are a little less expensive than the current protocol. 
Signed warrants
Next, we describe an implementation of the delegation model based on signed warrants. A description of the system and its protocols is given in Section 4.2.1. It is evaluated in Section 4.2.2.
Delegation system
As in Section 4.1, this implementation is limited to rights issued by I (henceforth called mainrights) and to direct sub-rights thereof. Main-rights are represented as digital credentials, while sub-rights are represented as signatures. The attributes of the main-right's credential consist of a tuple (s u , e, RSet), where s u is the owner's user secret, e is the right's revocation tag and RSet is the specification of the right. A sub-right is issued by constructing a new tuple (s u , e , RSet ) and by signing a commitment on this tuple. This signature is created with the main-right's credential by using the CredSign protocol. Note that we sign a commitment rather than the actual tuple (s u , e , RSet ). This way the tuple is hidden from any third parties. A sub-right can then be shown to a verifier by presenting her with the signature and by proving some claims about the signed commitment. Different show-protocols based on the same sub-right can be linked to each other.
To achieve correct revocation, the sub-right's revocation tag e may not be arbitrarily chosen by Do. Instead, it must be requested from RM through an auxiliary IssueRevTags protocol. During this protocol, Do retrieves a credential Cred rev containing a list of revocation tags. RM does not know the final value of these tags, but she is able to recover them as soon as the corresponding main-right is revoked. Furthermore, by means of the attribute value e also occurring in Cred rev , Cred rev is invisibly bound to the main right's credential.
The system is depicted in Figures 3 and 4 . Table 3 gives an overview of the communication channels and their characteristics. We now give a brief overview of the protocols.
Registration. Registration is identical as in Section 4.1.
IssueRight. Do first proves to be registered to the system. If successful, she retrieves a k-show credential Cred right containing three attributes: a copy of attribute s do in Cred do , an issuer-chosen revocation tag e and a specification RSet of rights and validity periods. • Registration.
Cred u = CredGet( * , {s := Cred ext .s}) RG
Cred right = CredGet((k), {Owner := Cred do .s, revTag := e, rights := RSet}) I
• IssueRevTags. 
Cred rev = CredGet((*), {revTag := e, e 1 := C rev .e 1u + e 1i , . . . , e n := C rev .e nu + e ni }) RM 
Do
[DoDe]
retrieve e i and SRset from O sub
• ShowRight(Cred right , ).
publish Sig show
• RevokeRight. IssueRevTags. This protocol is used by a delegator to retrieve n additional revocation tags for the sub-rights of a certain main-right. It can be executed multiple times and proceeds as follows. First, Do creates a commitment C rev containing random values e 1u , . . . , e nu . This commitment, together with the main-right's revocation tag e and a verifiable encryption encr of (e 1u , . . . , e nu ) are sent to RM. Do also proves that encr is constructed correctly. After receiving random values e 1i , . . . , e ni from RM, De proves that value e is the same revocation tag as is encoded in her mainright. For this, she creates a credential-based signature Sig rev . This ensures that RM is provided with sufficient evidence of the transaction. Finally, when e has not been revoked, a credential Cred rev is issued by RM. The attributes of this credential consist of e and of the new revocation tags e 1 , . . . , e n which are constructed as e k = e ki + e ku for k = 1, . . . , n. Note that the resulting e k 's are unknown to RM, and that their final value cannot be manipulated by Do.
Value n is fixed beforehand and determines the amount of retrieved revocation tags. In order to keep Cred rev 's size limited, n should not be too large. Also, for similar reasons as in the IssueRight protocol, communication channel [DoRM] does not need to be confidentiality-protected.
DelegateRight. During the DelegateRight protocol, Do issues a t-show sub-right to De. The protocol may be preceded by an optional identification step from De to Do and is performed over a confidentiality-protected communication channel.
De creates a commitment C de on her user secret s de . She sends it to Do and proves that it is constructed correctly. Upon success, Do creates two commitments C do and C sub . C do encodes her main-right's revocation tag e, while C sub contains both the revocation tag e i and the rightspecifications SRSet of the prospective sub-right. Commitments C do , C de and C sub are then signed by means of the CredSign protocol for credentials Cred right and Cred rev . This results in a signature tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) which is sent to De. The signatures ensure the following properties.
• The signer owns credentials Cred right and Cred rev .
• The same revocation tag e is encoded in both Cred right and Cred rev .
• The rights encoded into C sub are a subset of the rights encoded into Cred right . (Here, we define a set of rights A to be a subset of another set B if its rights and validity periods are more strict than or equal to those specified in B.)
• C sub 's attribute subRevTag is one of the revocation tags encoded in Cred rev .
• t show-instances of Cred right are spent during the creation of Sig sub1 .
ShowRight. Due to their difference in structure, main-rights and sub-rights cannot be shown in a uniform way. Hence, the ShowRight protocol is split into separate protocols for both type of rights. A base-right is shown by showing its corresponding credential Cred right and by proving that its revocation tag revTag does not belong to a blacklist BL. Additionally, Do proves that the rights required to access the service (Nset) are a subset of her encoded set of rights Cred right .rights. 
[ERM]
A sub-right is a set of signatures (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) on a tuple (C do , C de , C sub ). During the show protocol, De provides V with a signature Sig show which proves that De is the owner of user secret s de encoded into C de . Sig show contains signatures (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ). In order to prevent replay attacks, Sig show also contains some verifier-provided state information si. De then proves that her sub-right has not been revoked and that it contains sufficient rights for accessing V 's services. V checks the signatures and publishes Sig show as a proof that one additional instance of the right is spent. She also checks if the sub-right is spent more times than allowed. Note that this last check can be deferred until after the protocol. In this case, deanonymization options must be added, such that De's identity can be revealed should overspending be detected.
RevokeRight. A right is revoked by adding its revocation tag to a public blacklist BL. If revTag belongs to a main-right, all rights in its revocation tree are revoked by retrieving the signatures Sig rev on revTag and by decrypting the as such found encryptions encr. Note that RM will generally not be aware of the correct decryption key. In this case, decryption requires the interaction with a trusted third party.
As explained in Section 4.1.2, revocation requests by unidentified entities must be backed up with a proof that this entity is also the issuer of the right. For anonymous users, this can be accommodated by the protocol in Figure 5 .
Evaluation
F1. Ad-hoc delegation is trivially achieved.
F2. Constraints on the usage of a right (F2a), such as validity periods and limitations of the right, can naturally be encoded into the rights attributes. V checks the adherence to these constraints during the ShowRight protocol. Next to this, a limit can be set on the maximal number of usages of a right. For sub-rights, the fact that this limit is not exceeded can be checked by V either on-line during the ShowRight protocol or off-line when the ShowRight protocol is already finished. In the latter case, deanonymization options must be included to ensure the identification of the right's owner in case she overspent the sub-right.
The current construction of Figures 3 and 4 does not support any additional constraints on the delegation process (F2b). Nevertheless, constraints on Do's delegation capabilities can be encoded.
• The maximal number of delegations performed by Do can be fixed. For this, an additional show-mode (here named the delegation-mode) is added to credential Cred right . The maximal number of show instances in this new mode equals the maximal number of delegations allowed for Do. Whenever a sub-right is issued, Cred right is shown t times in original mode and one time in delegation-mode. During the ShowRight protocol, Do shows Cred right only in the original mode.
• Since the system itself is limited to rights issued by I and to direct sub-rights thereof, no maximal depth for the delegation tree must be encoded into the credential. Main-rights will have a delegation tree of depth at most one, while sub-rights will have no delegation tree at all.
• Currently, the only constraint on a sub-right is its requirement to be a subset of the rights encoded into Cred right . More specific constraints can be encoded by including an additional attribute SubrightsSpec in Cred right . This attribute contains the most general specifications of an allowed sub-right, including maximal bounds on validityperiods. Whenever the DelegateRight protocol is executed, instead of proving the relation (rights ⊇ C sub .rights), Do then demonstrates the relation (SubrightsSpec ⊇ C sub .rights).
• Constraints on the choice of sub-right owners can be encoded using similar techniques as described in Section 4.1.
A1. Service access is anonymous, even if multiple entities collaborate and freely exchange their information. This applies both to main-rights and to sub-right. Unlinkability of service access is also achieved for main-rights. Sub-rights are linkable due to the uniqueness of tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ). In order to overcome this problem, a t-show sub-right can be issued as t separate one-show sub-rights. Note, however, that this solution is rather expensive and that it fails for unlimited-show sub-rights. Finally, as mentioned before, right indistinguishability is not achieved.
A2. Provided that no revocations are performed, subright unlinkability is trivially achieved. When a right is revoked, all revocation tags of this right and of its sub-rights are retrieved and linked. A "skeleton" of the right's delegation tree can then be reconstructed. This skeleton contains as its nodes the revocation tags of possible sub-rights, but not the sub-rights themselves. Users who are willing to display the specifications of their revoked sub-rights, may place it at the correct position in the tree. As such, some limited but nevertheless additional information concerning a user's delegation behavior may be retrieved.
One way to avoid these unwanted linkabilities is by not allowing any revocations. This is, however, not a reasonable solution. A good compromise is the adoption of "medium-size" validity periods. These time periods should be short enough to avoid most revocations on the one hand but long enough to avoid burdensome renewals on the other hand.
A3. Delayed monitoring of main-rights can again be achieved using the pseudorandom function of Dodis and Yampolskiy [11] . It requires the following additions to the protocol.
• During the IssueRight protocol, Do picks a random value w and computes a verifiable encryption V w of w as well as a commitment C do containing w as attribute. She then sends V w and C do to I and proves the relation V w = VE(C do .w) using the CommProps primitive. If I accepts, an additional attribute w := C do .w is added to Cred right .
• During the DelegateRight protocol, Do computes y = F (w, i) for a value i ∈ D (with D a predefined domain) which has not been used before. The extended tuple (C do , C de , C sub , y) is signed by Do. Additionally, during the creation of Sig sub1 , Do proves that y has been formed correctly.
• During the ShowRight protocol for the main-right, Do computes y = F (w, i) for a yet unused value i ∈ D. Do sends y to V and proves to her that it is constructed correctly. If the ShowRight protocol is successful, V publishes y.
The ShowRight protocol for a sub-right is the same as in Figure 4 . Note that, in this case, y is published as a side-effect of the publishing of Sig show .
Monitoring of a sub-right is achieved by checking the verifier's logs for a tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ). This monitoring is immediate, cannot be switched off and can only be performed by Do. Indeed, even though V (and hence any other entity) can link different usages of the same sub-right, she cannot link this sub-right to a particular issue protocol or to different sub-rights issued during the same interaction.
S1
. Main-rights are unforgeable (S1) due to the unforgeability of credentials. Sub-rights are unforgeable due to the unforgeability of the CredSign signature scheme.
S2. Only correct sub-rights are accepted by the verifier. During the DelegateRight protocol, Do explicitly proves that the sub-rights validity periods and right specifications are more strict than or equal to what is specified in the main-right. By loosing t show-instances of her mainright, she additionally proves her eligibility to issue a t-show sub-right. Note that Do is not prohibited to issue revoked sub-rights. Issuing such rights would be useless, however, as they would be refused by V anyway.
S3. Transferability of rights is discouraged by the use of non-transferable user secrets s u . An exception to this is credential Cred rev , which does not contain s u . For this construct, transferring is discouraged by the fact that it may only harm its original owner Do. This is because (1) transferring Cred rev does not enable another user to employ its encoded revocation tags e i , and (2) transferring Cred rev does enable other users to revoke the sub-rights issued by Do.
S4. Multiple rights can be shown to the same verifier. These rights are either main-rights, subrights or a combination of both. Consistency of the rights can be demonstrated by an additional proof that the Owner attributes of the main-rights and the attribute s of commitments C de in the sub-rights, are all the same value.
S5. All rights are revocable and the revocation of a main-right implies the revocation of its corresponding sub-rights. In addition, unidentified entities can be prohibited from successfully requesting revocations.
S6. Conditional deanonymization can easily be added uses the techniques described in Section 3. Performance requirements. All protocols are relatively cheap and no additional entity is needed for the delegation. In contrast to the system of Section 4.1, the number of potential delegates does not affect the system's performance in a meaningful way. It does, however, have its impact on the number of revocation tags needed by Do. In general, a good trade-off should be made between the number of tags in Cred rev and the expected number of delegates. The number of tags in Cred rev should be small enough to ensure the efficient execution of the DelegateRight protocol. On the other hand, it should be large enough to limit the number of executions of the IssueRevTags protocol.
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New credentials
The following system is almost identical to the system presented in Section 4.2. This time, the signatures representing the sub-right can be exchanged with I for a new credential. Hence, all rights are represented using the same credential structure. Interesting properties resulting from this addition are delegation trees of arbitrary depth, unlinkable service access and right indistinguishability. Note that, due to the adoption of arbitrary depths of delegation trees, a main-right is not necessarily issued during an IssueRight protocol.
System
The system is depicted in Figure 6 . The communication channels and their characteristics are summarized in Table 4 . Protocols Registration, IssueRight and IssueRevTags are the same as in Section 4.2 and are, hence, not depicted in Figure 6 . A credential representing a right is denoted as Cred right , Cred main or Cred sub , depending on its function as a general right (i.e. irrespective of its classification as a sub-right or a main-right), a main-right or a sub-right.
DelegateRight. The DelegateRight protocol consists of two phases which can be separated in time. It may be preceded by an optional identification step.
The first phase is performed over a confidentiality-protected communication channel and results in De having a signature tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) on commitments (C do , C de , C sub ). The execution of this phase is identical to that of the DelegateRight protocol in Section 4.2.
During the second phase, De sends a signature Sig de to I. This signature includes tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) and additionally proves that De is the owner of user secret s de encoded into C de . If Sig de is accepted by I, and if (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) has not been shown to I before, De retrieves a new credential of which the attributes are based on the values encoded into C sub . 
Do
request revocation of the right with revocation tag revTag -RM RM. set L = {revT ag}, while L = {} do the following 1. remove arbitrary value e from L, add e to blacklist BL 2. check archive for Sig ShowRight. During the ShowRight protocol, U shows her credential Cred right to V. Additionally, she proves that it has not been revoked and that it contains sufficient rights for accessing V 's services.
RevokeRight. This protocol is based on the RevokeRight protocol in Section 4.2. As a right's delegation tree can have an arbitrary depth, the original protocol is extended to be iterative and to be repeated until all of the rights in the delegation tree are revoked.
Evaluation
F2. Constraints on the usage of a right are identical as in Section 4.2. Constraints on delegation are also as in Section 4.2, except that now, a delegation tree can have an arbitrary depth. Issuer I can limit this depth by encoding an additional attribute MaxDepth into each credential Cred right . Whenever the DelegateRight protocol is executed, Do determines a new value for this attribute and encodes it into C sub . She also extends Sig sub1 with a proof of the relation (MaxDepth > 0 ∧ MaxDepth > C sub .MaxDepth). Finally, during phase 2 of the protocol, I encodes C sub .MaxDepth into the resulting credential.
A1. Service accesses are anonymous and unlinkable. Right indistinguishability is also achieved.
A2. Properties and suggestion concerning sub-right unlinkability are the same as in Section 4.2.
A3. Delayed monitoring of rights can be added using the verifiable pseudorandom function of Dodis and Yampolskiy [11] . A detailed description of the necessary protocol-additions is given below.
(a) During the IssueRight protocol, Do encodes a random value w into a new commitment C do and provides I with a verifiable encryption V w of w. She also proves that V w is correctly formed based on C do .w. If this is successful, w is added as an additional attribute to Cred right .
(b) During phase 1 of the DelegateRight protocol, De picks a random value v and encodes it as an additional attribute into C de . She also computes a verifiable encryption V v = V E(v) and sends V v to Do. Do then creates a value y = F (w, i) for a yet unused value i ∈ D and then signs the tuple (C do , C de , C sub , y, V v ) as before using the CredSign. In addition, she extends Sig sub1 with a proof that y is correctly formed.
(c) During phase 2 of the DelegateRight protocol, De proves to I that V v is correctly formed. If successful, I adds value v as an additional attribute to Cred sub . Note that, in order to perform this step, I does not need to know v's value. Finally, I publishes De's request Sig de .
(d) During the ShowRight protocol. U provides V with a value y = F (x, i), for x the secret value (i.e. w for a right issued by I or v for a sub-right) encoded into U 's credential Cred right and for i ∈ D with D a predefined domain. She also proves to V that this value is correctly formed. Note that a different value i must be used during each interaction.
(e) Upon fulfillment of the tracking condition, I (or Do) iteratively requests the decryptions x of the relevant verifiable encryptions. She can then compute values y = F (x, i) for all i ∈ D, and subsequently track all actions performed by the right or any of its sub-rights.
As value V v encoded into De's request Sig de is publicly known, anyone can initiate the monitoring of this sub-right. In order to prohibit this unauthorized monitoring, a decryption request must be accompanied with a proof of (indirect) issuance of the right that is to be monitored. As an example for a sub-right determined by values (C do , C de , C sub , y, V v ), this can be done by proving knowledge of values i and w such that F (w, i) = y. Indeed, should an unauthorized entity be able to find values i and w such that F (w, i) = y, then she would also be able to break the pseudorandomness of F (·, ·).
Security requirements. Security requirements S1, S2, S3, S5 and S6 are satisfied for similar reasons as in Section 4.2. Consistency of rights (S4) is achieved by proving equality of the Owner attributes encoded in the credentials representing the different rights.
Performance requirements. The system's complexity is comparable to that of Section 4.2. One difference is the use of an additional entity I during the DelegateRight protocol. This results in a less efficient protocol, as De needs to perform an additional interaction with I in order to retrieve her sub-right. In the next section, we show how this problem can be alleviated in systems with more flexible anonymity requirements.
Hybrid System
Finally, we briefly discuss a hybrid system. The system combines the ideas of Sections 4.2 and 4.3, and as such enables a more flexible trade-off between performance and anonymity requirements. In particular, the same performance and anonymity characteristics are achieved as in the signed warrant system of Section 4.2. Next to this, additional anonymity can be acquired at the cost of one more protocol execution with I. The system's structure and protocols are the same as is Section 4.2. One difference is the adoption of an additional protocol TransformToMainRight. This protocol enables U to transform sub-rights (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) into valid main-right credentials Cred right . Its structure is depicted in Figure 7 and is based on phase two of the DelegateRight protocol of Section 4.3. The protocol is executed over an integrity protected and anonymous communication channel, and preceded by the authentication of I to De. First, De sends a signature Sig de to I. This signature includes tuple (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) and additionally proves that De owns user secret s de encoded into C de . If this succeeds, and if (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) has not been shown to I before, I finds out how many times the sub-right has been shown to a verifier. For this, she counts the number of published signatures Sig show containing (Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ). Based on this number r and on the original showlimit t of the sub-right, I issues a new (t − r)-show credential Cred right . Additionally, she publishes Cred right = CredGet((t − r), {owner := C de .de, revTag := C sub .subRevTag, rights := C sub .rights}) I
(Sig sub1 , Sig sub2 ) as to ensure that it will not be accepted during future executions of the ShowRight protocol.
Comparison
A comparison of our techniques is given in Table 5 . Note that the hybrid system of Section 4.4 is not included, as its properties depend heavily on the application for which it is used. In general, these properties are an application-specific combination of the features for a signed warrant system and a new credential system. As can be seen from Table 5 , each of the techniques has its own advantages and disadvantages. Hence, the choice of a system depends very much on the requirements of the application that is to be implemented.
The system based on transferable credentials is the least flexible of the four. It is also the only technique which does not enable sub-right unlinkability. On the other hand, it can be used very efficiently when the number of delegates is limited and when their identities are known beforehand. As an example for such applications, we think of a loyalty card or a membership card which can be used by all members of the same family.
The system based on signed warrants is very flexible and additionally enables sub-right unlinkability. The disadvantages of this technique are the poor linkability properties of sub-rights with respect to verifiers and to main-right owner Do. Therefore, its best usage is in applications where sub-rights can be shown only a limited number of times and where tracking by Do does not impose any major problems. An example of such an application might be a drug prescription. As the patient is too ill herself, she will assign another user to pick up the medicines at the pharmacy.
The system based on new credentials is very general. It meets all flexibility and privacy requirements of Section 2.3. Complexity goes up a little, however, as an additional entity is needed for the issuing of sub-rights. This system can best be used for applications with very broad requirements. An example of this can be the complex access structure of a medical database. Medical doctors retrieve access to the general database. Additionally, they can grant more limited accesses to specific parts of the database to their assistants or nurses.
Finally, the hybrid system combines all characteristics of signed warrants and of the new cre-dential technique. It can be used in all settings for which the new credential technique can be used. In addition, the user has more flexibility when it comes to trading in anonymity for performace. all security all security all security requirements (S1-S5) requirements (S1-S5) requirements (S1-S5) are satisfied are satisfied are satisfied complexity raises with nb of good, no additional good, additional delegates, no additional entity needed entity needed entity needed
